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Mandating Early Neutral
Evaluations: Efficient or Excessive?
William J. Baker
Abstract: This paper explores whether mandating
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), specifically in the form
of early neutral evaluations (ENEs), actually improves
efficiency in federal courts. This paper attempts to challenge
and test the presumption that ADR inherently promotes
efficiency in all civil cases.
Part I introduces the reader to ENEs, ADR, their
presence in federal courts, and efficiency’s role within this
framework. Part II challenges the notion that ADR and
efficiency are inherently linked, and asks whether mandating
ENEs can prove if this inherent efficiency exists. Part III
presents the legal theory that addresses this question, tending
to support the notion that mandating ENEs would promote
settlement and efficiency. Part IV presents the empirical
research addressing this question, tending to show that there
is no discernable increase in efficiency among federal courts
that mandate ENEs. Part V attempts to reconcile the
evidence and theory, and presents recommendations based
on the findings.
I.

Introduction
Imagine you are a plaintiff with a righteous case
against a morally bankrupt defendant. You have the
financial resources, emotional endurance, and expertise to
take the case to trial and pursue a multi-million-dollar
judgment. As you predicted, your opponent denies all
wrongdoing and uses every tactic possible to hamper
litigation. You know that the defendant will never settle, as
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some public figures have famously boasted.1 You remain
unfazed, until your lawyer tells you the date and time for an
upcoming settlement conference. Has the defense had a
change of heart? Has your opponent rescinded their public
bravado?2
If you filed in certain federal courts, not necessarily.
You could be headed into a court-mandated settlement
conference, fully aware that the next few hours will be a
fruitless exercise in finger-pointing. Yet both parties must
spend time and money to participate in this process intended
to save them from spending more time and money. At the
end of the conference, you’ve simply incurred more legal
fees without any benefit. This cynical hypothetical serves to
challenge the notion that court-mandated settlement efforts
inherently help parties save time and money in litigation.
This paper aims to test that idea empirically and by applying
relevant legal theory. But before doing so, important terms
and background information must be defined.
The early neutral evaluation (ENE), sometimes
referred to as a case evaluation or early case assessment,3 is
an “informal process in which a third-party evaluator
provides a non-binding evaluation of the matters in
controversy, assists the parties in identifying areas of
agreement, offers case planning suggestions, and assists in
settlement discussions.”4 Parties to a case most often meet
with this evaluator before substantial discovery in a case has
occurred.5 The evaluator is typically an experienced expert
with the primary responsibility of analyzing legal arguments
See Russ Choma, Donald Trump, the Man Who Never Settles, Agrees to Settle
Trump University Lawsuits, MOTHER JONES, November 18, 2016,
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/11/trump-ready-settle-trumpuniversity-fraud-cases/.
2
See id.
3
Erin D. Guyton, Early Neutral Evaluation, 60 MISS. LAW. 46 (2014).
4
Alex Sanders & John S. Nicholas, Early Neutral Evaluation, TRIAL
HANDBOOK FOR S.C. LAWYERS §39:6.
5
Id.
1
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and providing a candid evaluation of each side’s strengths
and weaknesses. 6 However, the expert completes this
assessment with facilitating a settlement as the overall
objective.7 As the settlement goal suggests, ENEs are a form
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), a “method of
resolving disputes without litigation.”8 The ENE is a less
prevalent form of ADR than mediation or arbitration 9 but
applies to a number of legal settings: commercial disputes,10
family law,11 and civil cases in many state12 and federal13
courts.
ADR, including ENE, is advertised as “usually less
formal, less expensive, and less time-consuming” than

U.S. Equal Emp’t. Opportunity Comm’n.: Federal Sector, Early Neutral
Evaluation, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal-sector/early-neutral-evaluation (last
visited Dec. 17, 2021).
7
Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 167 (2009).
8
Tala Esmaili & Krystyna B. Gilkis, Alternative Dispute Resolution, CORNELL
LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution (last visited
Dec. 17, 2021).
9
See id. (ENE not listed among the “most famous ADR methods,” which
include mediation, arbitration, conciliation, negotiation, and transaction).
10
See AM. ARB. ASS’N., Early Neutral Evaluation: Getting an Expert’s
Assessment, ADR.ORG, 1–2
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Early_Neutral_Ev
aluation.pdf (describing how parties may include ENE provisions in contracts
with one another).
11
See Cindy M. Perusse, Early Neutral Evaluation as a Dispute Resolution Tool
in Family Court, 41 COLO. LAW. 37, May 2012, at 40.
12
See, e.g., Preparing for Evaluation, SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL., CNTY. OF
ORANGE,
https://www.occourts.org/directory/civil/alternative-disputeresolution/preparing-for-evaluation.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2021); Early
Case Management/Early Neutral Evaluation, MINN. JUD. BRANCH,
https://www.mncourts.gov/Help-Topics/ENE-ECM.aspx (last visited Dec. 17,
2021); Mediation & Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), STATE OF ME. JUD.
BRANCH, https://www.courts.maine.gov/programs/adr/index.html (last visited
Dec. 17, 2021).
13
See ADR in the Federal District Courts—District-by-District Summaries, U.S.
DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/olp/file/827536/download
(last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
6
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traditional litigation. 14 The U.S. Department of Justice
claimed to save $134,313,071 and 11,269 months of
litigation from 2013 to 2017 by using ADR. 15 Businesses
that use ADR may save millions of dollars in legal fees, with
potentially 99% fewer costs per dispute than a trial would
entail. 16 These savings most often occur by avoiding
extensive discovery, the most expensive part of litigation.17
This makes ENE an especially attractive type of ADR
because, like the name implies, it occurs early in litigation
and before parties incur most discovery costs. 18 While
electronic discovery has lowered costs in some respects, the
accompanying data and retention infrastructure still makes
ADR an attractive option when compared to litigation.19
As these cost considerations suggest, saving time
and money strongly incentivizes parties to use ADR.
Reflecting the mantra that “time is money,” time and money
generally equate in this context because the vast majority of

JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., ADR Types & Benefits, JUD. BRANCH OF CAL.: CAL.
CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/3074.htm#panel4537 (last visited Dec. 17,
2021).
15
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, Alternative Dispute Resolution
at the Department of Justice, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/olp/alternative-dispute-resolutiondepartment-justice (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
16
See, e.g., Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Why It Doesn’t Work and Why It Does, HARV. BUS. REV. (May–June 1994),
https://hbr.org/1994/05/alternative-dispute-resolution-why-it-doesnt-workand-why-it-does (“At Chevron, for instance, ADR-based mediation of one
dispute cost $25,000, whereas mediation through outside counsel would have
cost an estimated $700,000 and going to court as much as $2.5 million over a
period of three to five years.”).
17
See David H. Lichter, A Neutral’s View of Preliminary Arbitration Issues, 39
ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 59, 60 (2021).
18
See Sanders & Nicholas, supra note 4.
19
See generally Tzipora Goodfriend-Gelernter, How to Avoid the Death of Your
Case by Two Billion Paper Cuts: Encouraging Arbitration as an Alternative
Way to Resolve Costly Discovery Disputes, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 257
(2013) (discussing the increasing prevalence of discovery requests for
electronically stored information (ESI), and suggesting mandatory binding
arbitration as a means to resolve disputes thereabout).
14
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legal costs comprises hourly fees.20 While a speedy solution
may cost more in other contexts, that is not usually the case
in litigation due to the hourly fee structure. Therefore, for
purposes of this paper, efficiency will solely refer to the
ability to save time and money. Claiming something is
efficient here only means that it uses less time and money
than an alternative does. Efficiency will not refer to saving
other resources, such as energy or materials.21
Having briefly defined efficiency and addressed its
role within the ADR context, it is important to acknowledge
that ADR does provide benefits outside pure efficiency
concerns. First, mediators can propose unique or creative
solutions that are less likely to result from litigation. This
can be particularly helpful in the commercial context where
financial interests can align with creative thinking rather
than a “win or lose” mentality. 22 In the public context,
entities can also offer policy changes as a settlement term to
appease an aggrieved citizen. 23 In addition to pure
efficiency, ADR can limit naturally hostile and potentially
See 2018 Martindale Attorney Compensation Report, MARTINDALE LEGAL
MKTG. NETWORK, 12 (2018), https://www.martindale.com/research/2018Attorney-Compensation-Report/ (to access report, fill in fields for “First Name,”
“Last Name,” “E-mail Address,” “ZIP Code,” and “Firm Name”; then click
“DOWNLOAD”; then click on the subsequently downloaded PDF file) (76%
of 7,800 attorney respondents reporting billing for legal services with hourly
rate).
21
Efficiency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/efficiency.
22
Honorable John DiBlasi, Creative Solutions in the Commercial Mediation
Process, NATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION (NAM),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/creative-solutions-in-the-commercial99760/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2021) (A judicial mediator in New York recounts
facilitating a crucial commercial project through a cost-sharing scheme,
consolidating complex bankruptcy claims through arbitration, and preventing a
suit altogether by highlighting business risks associated with making a dispute
public).
23
Shelby Rose, Arkansas State Police changes PIT maneuver policy following
lawsuit settlement, ABC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2021),
https://katv.com/news/local/arkansas-state-police-changes-pit-maneuverpolicy-following-lawsuit-settlement.
20
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traumatic emotions associated with litigation. 24
Furthermore, ADR also provides the parties greater control
over their case’s outcome since they can negotiate settlement
terms and choose whether or not to accept them.25 While
these examples are not exclusive, they demonstrate that
efficiency is not always the sole concern of parties engaged
in ADR.
That said, efficiency frequently remains the most
salient concern, especially among commercial parties in
federal courts.26 Perhaps as a result of such concerns, and in
addition to legislative requirements, each of the ninety-four
federal judicial districts offer some form of the ADR
process.27 While most districts give their courts or litigants
discretion to utilize ADR, eighteen districts make it
mandatory in some fashion.28 For example, both the Central
and Eastern Districts of California presumptively refer civil
cases to their respective ADR programs unless certain
exemption categories apply. 29 Others, like the Western
District of Tennessee and District of South Carolina,
automatically refer civil cases to ADR unless the parties optout. 30 The Districts of Hawaii and Minnesota go a step
See generally Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in
Litigation, 12 INT’L. REV. OF L. & ECON. 41 (1992),
https://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/huang/EmoRespInLitig.pdf.
25
Jud. Council Cal., supra note 14.
26
See generally Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem
of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765 (2010),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1486&context=d
lj.
27
See U.S. Dept. Just., supra note 13.
28
Id.
29
C.D. Cal. Gen. Ord. 11–10 §§ 5 and 6 (2015),
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/general-orders/GO-1110_2.pdf; E.D. Cal. L.R. 271,
http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/assets/File/EDCA%20Local%20Rules
%20Effective%201-1-15.pdf.
30
W.D. Tenn. Plan for Alt. Disp. Res. § 2.1 (2018),
https://www.tnwd.uscourts.gov/pdf/content/ADRPlan.pdf; D.S.C. L.R. 16.03,
http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/Rules/2014/Civil%20Rules%20-%20August%20
20,%202014.pdf.
24
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further and mandate a mediated settlement conference while
offering other ADRs as voluntary. 31 The District of
Vermont is more prescriptive, mandating ENEs in the vast
majority of civil cases. 32 But the Southern District of
California offers the strictest mandate, requiring both ENEs
and settlement conferences in civil cases with very narrow
exceptions.33
To justify these rules, each of the ninety-four
federal district advertises that ADR saves litigants time and
money.34 This further promotes the idea that efficiency is
the prevailing incentive for ADR. The federal district that
best captures this sentiment is the Northern District of
California, which touts “one of the oldest and most wellrespected ADR programs in the United States.” 35 The
Northern District of California notably began their ADR
program in 1985 and first devised the ENE.36 Their efforts
predated the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 that
required each federal district to authorize the use of at least
one ADR process in all civil actions. 37 In other words,
federal judges in San Francisco were ADR’s pioneers.
Aside from its forward thinking, the Northern
District of California undoubtedly has a well-run and robust
ADR program that includes both “ADR Local Rules” and an
D. Haw. L.R. 88.1 (2009),
https://www.hid.uscourts.gov/docs/localrules/Civil_Local_Rules_08_13_curre
nt.pdf?pid=11&mid=47.
32
D. Vt. L.R. 16.1 (2017),
https://www.vtd.uscourts.gov/sites/vtd/files/LocalRules.pdf.
33
S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 16.1(c) (2017),
https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/_assets/pdf/rules/2021.07.5%20Local%20Rule
s.pdf.
34
See generally C.D. Cal. Gen. Ord., supra note 29.
35
ADR in the Northern District, U.S. DIST. CT. N DIST. CAL. (Jun. 30, 2021),
https://cand.uscourts.gov/about/court-programs/alternative-dispute-resolutionadr/.
36
Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L.R. 1, 12 (1990),
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2935&context=flr.
37
28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58.
31
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“ADR Procedures Handbook.”38 Within these ADR Local
Rules, the court defines the purpose of the program:
The Court recognizes that full, formal litigation of
claims can impose large economic burdens on parties and
can delay resolution of disputes for considerable
periods…The Court adopts these ADR Local Rules to make
available to litigants a broad range of court-sponsored ADR
processes to provide quicker, less expensive, and potentially
more satisfying alternatives.39
Simply put, ADR promotes efficiency.
II.

Questioning Inherent Efficiency
This efficiency claim, summarized by the Northern
District of California, supported by data from public and
private entities, and institutionalized through federal courts’
local rules, presents ADR as a universally beneficial process.
But is ADR actually beneficial to every civil case? While
the question may seem superficial, imagining scenarios that
illustrate the concept isn’t challenging. What if parties
participate in ADR, but the emotions during the process
actually inflame tensions, worsen cooperation, and the case
goes to trial anyway?40
For example, a permissible “threat” in settlement
negotiations is pointing out that embarrassing facts could be

ADR in the Northern District, supra note 35.
N.D. Cal. ADR L.R. 1–2(a),
https://cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/7/Local_Rules_ADR_Effective_May.1.20
18.pdf.
40
Alison Wood Brooks, Emotion and the Art of Negotiation, HARV. BUSINESS
REV. (December 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/emotion-and-the-art-ofnegotiation (last visited Dec. 17, 2021) (“Bringing anger to a negotiation is like
throwing a bomb into the process… [anger] motivates people to escalate the
conflict, the ‘fight’ part of the ‘fight-or-flight’ response.”); See Keith G. Allred
et al., The Influence of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation Performance, 70
ORG. BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 175 (June 1997) (finding
that negotiators who have high anger and low compassion had less desire to
work with each other in the future and achieved fewer joint gains).
38
39
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offered into evidence if the case goes to trial.41 While this
should deter further litigation, it could just as easily inflame
hostility between the opposing parties. Similarly, a litigant
that makes an unrealistic first settlement offer, often referred
to as an “anchor offer,” can derail negotiations.42 The other
party may view the initial offer as outrageously high or low,
and then make a similarly unrealistic counteroffer or refuse
further negotiation. Then either party could claim the other
negotiated in bad faith, tensions grow, and their mutual
cooperation inevitably suffers.43
In either of these scenarios, ADR results in parties
that are even more entrenched in their respective positions
and less likely to cooperate when necessary. Consequently,
informal meet and confer requirements are also less likely to
resolve discovery disputes, forcing parties to take these
issues to court.44 Thus, both parties end up spending more
time and money on a dispute that reasonable cooperation
would have otherwise resolved. In these types of situations,
ADR impeded reasonable cooperation and caused the parties
to eventually spend more time and money than they would
have without it. This also ignores the even more obvious
efficiency problem: that both parties spent time and money
on the ADR process without anything to show for it. Thus,
in certain cases, ADR poses a real efficiency risk. It may
actually be less efficient than litigation on its own.
Another, less obvious efficiency problem arises
within ENEs specifically. As already mentioned, one of the
AM. BAR ASSN., ABA Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations, § 4.3.2
Extortionate Tactics in Negotiations, August 2002,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/dispute_resoluti
on/dispute_resolution/settlementnegotiations.pdf.
42
Steven Riess, Settlement Practice in California: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 10 J.F.K. U. L. REV. 65 (2004).
43
Brooks, supra note 40.
44
See Jared M. Katz, Four Tips for Navigating a Discovery Dispute, AM. BAR
ASSN. PRACTICE POINTS (June 29, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercialbusiness/practice/2020/four-tips-for-navigating-discovery-dispute/.
41
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biggest benefits of ENEs is that it occurs before parties
engage in costly discovery. 45 However, discovery is the
primary method by which parties gain information about a
case and assess an accompanying case value. 46 Without
discovery, parties can be effectively left in the dark
regarding how to negotiate an appropriate settlement. 47
Thus, the ENE arguably occurs too early in some cases.48 If
an ENE occurs before enough information is available for
the evaluator to provide a useful opinion or for parties to
competently negotiate, ADR once again appears less
efficient than traditional litigation. 49 In this situation, the
parties have spent additional time and money negotiating
and meeting with an evaluator, only to proceed with
litigation as planned.
To avoid this problem, one would hope that counsel
could identify if ADR is unlikely to benefit their client’s case.
Counsel could gauge whether their client is emotionally
ready for settlement negotiations, if more discovery is
needed to understand pertinent facts, and the cordiality of the
party’s working relationship. 50 Those who conduct an

Sanders & Nicholas, supra note 4.
Lichter, supra note 17.
A theoretical example based on a real scenario that cannot be cited due to ENE
confidentiality: an ENE occurs before the plaintiff’s counsel can review bodycamera evidence in a police misconduct case. Plaintiff’s counsel bases their
negotiating position on the client’s account of events, who was partially
unconscious at the time the alleged misconduct occurred.
48
Fabio E Marino & Rebecca B Horton, The road less travelled for dispute
resolution – the benefits of ENE in patent litigation, IAM (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://www.iam-media.com/the-road-less-travelled-dispute-resolution-thebenefits-of-ene-in-patent-litigation.
49
Rosemary Howell, Is Mediation Really Like Fruit? – Does The Conflict Have
To Be Ripe?, KLUWER MEDIATION BLOG (July 31, 2018),
http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/07/31/mediation-really-likefruit-conflict-ripe/.
50
William Zartman, ‘Ripeness’: the importance of timing in negotiation and
conflict resolution, E-INT’L RELATIONS (Dec. 20, 2008), https://www.eir.info/2008/12/20/ripeness-the-importance-of-timing-in-negotiation-andconflict45
46
47
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accurate self-assessment would naturally avoid ADR if they
felt the process would be unproductive. But what if they
weren’t given the choice? As mentioned before, parties in
some federal districts must participate in ADR regardless of
their desire or belief in the process’s productivity. 51 This
then begs the question: does mandated ADR actually
promote efficiency?
While Professor Fiss did not address this exact
question in his influential comment Against Settlement, he
did express a related concern. 52 He believed settlement
should not be a “generic practice” or “institutionalized on a
wholesale or indiscriminate basis.”53 Fiss likely also did not
support indiscriminate ADR, since proponents of ADR
“exalt the idea of settlement” as the ideal outcome.54 While
Fiss blamed excessive focus upon efficiency for such
practices, there may actually be an efficiency-based
argument to support opposition to mandatory ADR. By
mandating ADR and making it “wholesale,” courts can make
litigation more costly for parties unlikely to benefit from it.
As shown in the prior hypotheticals, these kinds of cases are
not far-fetched.
But understanding why mandated ADR might be
inefficient leads to another major issue. How can you tell,
overall, if ADR hinders or improves efficiency? There is no
metric for a litigant’s emotions before or after a negotiation,
the likelihood of a discovery dispute settling if ADR hadn’t
inflamed tensions, or for less tangible efficiency benefits of
ADR. These sorts of incalculable variables present a
common problem. Without empirical testing, legal theories
resolution/#:~:text=Ripeness%20is%20only%20a%20condition,the%20persua
sion%20of%20a%20mediator.
51
See C.D. Cal. General Order 11-10 § 5 and 6; E.D. Cal. L.R. 271; Plan for
ADR in W.D. Tenn. § 2.1; D.S.C. L.R. 16.03; D. Haw. L.R. 88.1; D. Minn. L.R.
16.5; D. Vt. L.R. 16.1; S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 16.1(c).
52
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
53
Id. at 1075.
54
Id.
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are left to hypotheticals and anecdotal analysis. 55
Regrettably, only a few reliable efficiency metrics are
available in federal courts. Specifically, the metrics measure
how long it takes for a case to terminate after the complaint
is filed, at what procedural point the case was terminated,
and whether or not a case resulted in settlement.56
Which of these metrics offers the best insight
regarding overall efficiency? First, the length of time
between filing and termination doesn’t necessarily translate
into efficiency. Even though a long wait for trial is common,
the time and money spent on the case during this period can
vary greatly.57 Counsel could have filed for continuances
and spent relatively little time working on the case. In
addition, the average time between filing a civil case and
going to trial varies heavily depending upon the type of case
and filing district.58 Therefore, the length of time between
case filing and termination shouldn’t be used in measuring
overall efficiency.
However, the procedural point at which a case is
terminated can indicate efficiency with a major caveat. For
example, regardless of how complex or simple a case is,
parties will spend less time and money on litigation if they
settle before engaging in discovery. 59 Therefore, the
procedural point of termination correlates to efficiency, but
only if the case was terminated via settlement. If the case
See Gareth Davies, The Relationship between Empirical Legal Studies and
Doctrinal Legal Research, 2 ERASMUS L.R. 3 (2020).
56
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, Integrated Database Research Guide,
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/IDB-Research-Guide.pdf (last visited
Dec. 17, 2021) (“[T]ermination” refers to when a case is disposed of through a
final judgment or order; the data differentiates between cases that are
transferred, remanded, settled, etc.).
57
Civil Case Processing in the Federal District Courts: A 21st Century Analysis,
UNIV. OF DENV.: INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.
(2009),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/iaals_civil_case_
processing_in_the_federal_district_courts_0.pdf.
58
Id.
59
Guyton, supra note 3; ADR in the Federal District Courts –District-byDistrict Summaries, supra note 14.
55
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was terminated via dismissal without prejudice, transfer,
remand, or a partial summary judgment, then litigation can
potentially continue. Unfortunately, parsing case data along
the procedural point of termination is a complex empirical
task beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, the
variation among federal districts regarding the average
length of time between procedural benchmarks adds a
complex variable. 60 Therefore, the procedural point of
termination is not the best overall efficiency metric.
Whether a case settles is likely the best measure of
overall efficiency. At the most basic level, settlement
signals that litigation would have continued but for the
agreement between the parties. This holds true even if
parties settle extremely late in litigation like during trial. 61
Settlement puts an end to litigation expenses, or at least
introduces a lower cost ceiling. This is an imperfect
efficiency metric since an early dismissal can potentially
incur fewer costs than a later settlement, but it’s likely the
best possible given the available data. So, for the purposes
of this paper, it is assumed that settlement will always be
more a more efficient outcome for both parties when
compared to another case disposition. Even though this
cannot be true for every case in federal court, the assumption
is necessary to tie at least one metric to efficiency. In
addition, the assumption is reasonable since settling is more
efficient than going to trial for defendants and often results
in a better outcome for plaintiffs. 62 Thus, whether a case

Civil Case Processing in the Federal District Courts: A 21st Century Analysis,
supra note 57.
61
Reed Albergotti, Apple and Qualcomm have settled their epic lawsuit over
chip patents, THE WASHINGTON POST, (April 16, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/16/apple-qualcommface-off-epic-courtroom-drama/ (Qualcomm and Apple famously settled
during opening arguments at trial).
62
Supra notes 15–16; Johnathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better Than
Going to Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08law.html.
60
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settles is the best metric available for testing whether
mandated ADR promotes efficiency.
Having identified the best available efficiency
metric, the next problem is identifying how to use it. While
it is “conventional wisdom” that around 95% of civil cases
settle, this is a very misleading statistic. 63 The settlement
rate varies highly among different types of civil cases, and
most data is focused upon trial outcomes rather than pre-trial
dismissals. 64 So rather than focusing upon the settlement
rate, it may be best to focus on a simpler quotient. For every
federal civil case filed, how many do we know resulted in
settlement? This ratio offers a snapshot of the proportion of
cases that are known to have reached settlement. For
example, a filing to settlement ratio of “3.0” means that for
every three cases filed in federal court, one was recorded as
reaching a settlement. This does not mean that the
settlement rate is 33% because a settlement can occur after
another recorded disposition action that did not bar future
litigation.
Instead, the filing to settlement ratio offers a
glimpse at cases that settled during the course of normal
litigation and were reported to the court accordingly. Ideally,
any settlement that resulted from court-mandated ADR
would be recorded as such since the court was involved in
the negotiations. Thus, the filing to settlement ratio may at
least offer a signal regarding how well court-mandated ADR
promotes settlement and, in turn, it’s efficiency. A higher
ratio means less efficiency because more cases were filed
than were settled. A theoretically perfect efficiency ratio is
1.0, meaning every case filed resulted in a recorded
settlement. Rather than a definitive measure, the ratio is an
efficiency indicator.
While certainly imperfect, this
Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 (2009),
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/203/.
64
Id. at 130 (settlement rates varied from 24.8% to 87.2% depending on nature
of civil suits).
63
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approach is at least helpful in testing whether mandated
ADR is efficient.
III.

Legal Theory Analysis
But before diving into the numbers and drawing
conclusions, legal theory should be offered for comparison
with the empirical reality. As described in Parts I and II, the
cornerstone hypothetical in this paper is the case where
parties find mandated ADR to be less efficient than
traditional litigation.
Settlement negotiations were
unproductive; and participating in ADR ends up as an
additional and unnecessary cost. Thus, the most suitable
legal theory for analysis should deal with efficiency and
settlement negotiations.
One famed and infamously
misunderstood theory immediately comes to mind.
In 1960, Ronald Coase published his Nobel Prizewinning paper The Problem of Social Cost in the Journal of
Law and Economics.65 Coase attempted to address the role
of transaction costs in the context of efficiently allocating
property rights and negative externalities. 66 The problem
first became clear in the context of competing radio stations
using the same frequency to broadcast.67 Coase reasoned
that it didn’t matter whether competing radio stations
interfered with each other by broadcasting in the same
frequency.68 In theory, the radio station that could reap the
highest economic gain would simply pay the other stations
not to interfere with the frequency.69 Thus, a particular radio
frequency would be naturally allocated to its most efficient
(i.e. profitable) use and government regulations wouldn’t be
required.

R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
Id.
67
R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 56 J.L. & ECON.
879 (2013).
68
Id.
69
Coase, supra note 65.
65
66
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Coase then controversially extended the concept to
pollution, arguing that a polluter could theoretically pay a
victim to appropriately compensate them and maximize
profits without government regulation. 70 However, the
“theoretical” caveat was the primary subject of his
discussion. Coase explained that this sort of resolution
would only occur with property rights clearly defined and in
the absence of transaction costs that included negotiating,
writing and enforcing a contract, and organizing affected
parties.71 Many subsequent critiques explained why such a
negotiation was impossible. 72 Among them, critics and
commenters repeatedly pointed out that a “Coasean”
negotiation requires perfect information sharing.73
This particular barrier to perfect negotiation is
where court-mandated ADR gains some legal theory support.
Returning to the pessimistic hypothetical from the
introduction, two parties are forced to enter into an ENE that
neither believes (or perhaps wants) to be productive.
Without the district court’s prescriptive local rules,
settlement negotiations would not occur. Notwithstanding
the parties’ pessimism, the evaluator follows mediation best
practices during the ENE to promote candid communication
between all participants.74 Just as expected and in spite of
the evaluator’s best efforts, no settlement results from the
ENE. Both parties seemingly incurred a few additional
hours of legal fees with nothing to show for it.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 15.
Id. (Coase agreed that the hypothetical relied upon “very unrealistic
assumptions” and his intent was to highlight the significant role of transaction
costs rather than advocate for free-market negotiation in lieu of regulation).
73
See generally James E. Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions:
A Conceptual Overview, 18 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1971); William M. Landes,
An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Donald H.
Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1972).
74
See UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, Utah Mediation Best Practices Guide (2018),
https://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Mediation-BestPractices-Guide-Final-Draft.pdf.
70
71
72
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While this hypothetical sounds extremely
inefficient, it may find some saving grace in light of Coase.
Perfect negotiations require perfect information sharing,
something the parties have unwittingly come closer to
achieving during the ENE. In making their case for the
evaluator, each party likely highlighted their strongest
supporting facts and legal arguments. The opposing party
would not necessarily have this information at such an early
stage of litigation. Even though parties eventually have the
same facts to work with, they aren’t likely attuned to how
their opponent views the case. By listening to the facts and
arguments highlighted by their opponent, each litigant can
now better assess their own likelihood of success. They
could adjust their litigation strategy accordingly and more
accurately value the case for future negotiations.
Regardless of their resulting actions, both parties
now have new and helpful information due to a courtmandated ENE. Courts are also willing to impose sanctions
for failure to participate in good faith, meaning that at least
some useful information will likely be disclosed. 75
Moreover, the ENE often provides a uniquely confidential
setting that encourages candor, and parties can rely upon
confidentiality being enforced.76 This doesn’t mean that a
Coasean negotiation will follow an ENE, but a step towards
creating the necessary circumstances has occurred. Thus,
even if the ENE does not result in an immediate settlement
or worsens relations between the parties, both have gained
information that moves the needle closer to an efficient
outcome. In other words, the parties have advanced their
ability to reach a settlement.
See Nick v. Morgan’s Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (E.D. Mo. 2000)
(imposing sanctions on party that purposefully failed to send an agent with
settlement authority to ENE).
76
See In re Prohibition Against Disclosing ENE Comm’ns to Settlement Judges,
494 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that evaluator’s written
assessment of the case could not be disclosed to anyone outside the ENE
proceedings).
75
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In addition to the information gained from the
opposing party, one cannot forget the importance of the
neutral evaluator’s input. 77 Parties can similarly use the
neutral evaluator’s candid feedback to reassess their case and
strategy, a perspective unavailable in traditional litigation.
Furthermore, litigants can also use a mandated ENE to
efficiently communicate with the court and each other about
important potential discovery issues and stipulations. 78
Useful information sharing is the common theme among all
these benefits of a mandated ENE. Even if parties feel like
the mandated ENE wasn’t productive, the information
gained from the process supports the notion that it is more
efficient than litigation alone.
Aside from information sharing, mandating ADR
potentially provides another efficiency incentive. By
making an ADR process mandatory, federal districts have
essentially added a step to pursuing litigation in federal court,
thus increasing litigation costs. Even if the cost increase is
marginal, parties now have another incentive to avoid
litigation altogether. As a result, they may pursue a more
efficient resolution outside the court. While not directly
attributable to Coase, this incentive affirms the notion that
mandating ADR and ENEs promotes efficiency, even when
parties do not immediately reach a settlement. But like
everything just discussed, “theoretically” is a significant
limitation.

Id. at 1098–99 (“The evaluation that [the evaluator] presented in writing to
the parties is an extremely impressive document—reflecting a systematic,
detailed consideration of what the evaluator understood the relevant law and
evidence to be . . . It is powerful evidence about how much our evaluators give
of themselves in this program and how valuable to litigants their efforts can
be.”).
78
See Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227, 228 (S.D. Cal. 1993)
(explaining that parties informed the court during the ENE about a likely
discovery dispute); Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 212 F. Supp.
1217, 1219 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (showing that parties stipulated at the ENE a
remand for certain issues in the case and consolidation of others).
77
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IV.

Empirical Analysis
To address this limitation, empirical testing is
necessary. 79 As discussed in Part II, the best available
efficiency metric is whether a case reaches settlement. 80
Settlement is assumed to be a more efficient outcome for
both parties than continued litigation, trial, or any other case
disposition. 81 This measurement can be best used by
dividing the number of filings over the recorded settlement
dispositions, generating a filing to settlement ratio. A higher
ratio indicates a lower proportion of settled cases, and thus a
lower level of efficiency. But before engaging in the
necessary calculations, determining where such ratios offer
useful insights is essential.
As highlighted in Part I, the Southern District of
California has the most prescriptive ADR local rules in the
country.82 Within forty-five days of filing an answer in each
civil case, counsel and parties must attend an ENE.83 The
only exceptions are for more administrative cases like social
security and bankruptcy appeals. 84 But even then, the
presiding judge still has discretion to mandate an ENE. 85
The District of Vermont similarly makes ENEs mandatory
in the vast majority of civil case categories but schedules
them roughly halfway through discovery. 86 While subtly
distinct, both districts undoubtedly represent “wholesale”
ADR application through ENEs.
See Settling Cases, Steps in a Trial, How Courts Work, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept.
9, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_
education_network/how_courts_work/cases_settling/.
80
See supra Part II.
81
See Settling Cases, supra note 92. Another important assumption is that
settlement accompanies a mutual release and dismissal of the case with
prejudice. These stipulations prevent further litigation related to a case.
82
See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 16.1(c).
83
Id.
84
S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 16.1(e).
85
Id.
86
D. Vt. R. 16.1(b)–(f).
79
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Since most civil cases in both districts must undergo
an ENE, they are the ideal test subjects for whether
mandating ENEs is efficient. A higher percentage of civil
cases in these districts will inevitably participate in ENEs
than in a place like the Eastern District of Virginia, where
both parties must consent to ADR.87 If more cases enter into
an ENE, more settlements should logically occur if ENEs
inherently promote efficiency. But an obvious problem
arises in comparing federal districts. San Diego, Vermont,
and eastern Virginia are fundamentally distinct places with
different types and numbers of civil cases. Rather than
apples to oranges, comparing such places would be like
comparing blueberries to tomatoes. Technically, both are
round fruit, but that’s where their similarities end.
Instead, these two strict ENE districts should be
compared against a broader picture. How do their filing-tosettlement ratios stack up against the rest of the country? By
broadening the comparison, the ENE mandate variable is
more easily isolated. While local rules across districts vary
widely, they all have at least one common trait: none
mandate ENEs as strictly as the Southern District of
California or District of Vermont.88 As a result, undoubtedly
a smaller percentage of civil cases in other districts
participate in ENEs when compared to San Diego and
Vermont.89 Theoretically, these other districts would also
have a smaller proportion of cases that resulted in settlement
since a smaller proportion engaged in ENEs.
Thus, the filing-to-settlement ratio is most
prudently applied to the Southern District of California and
District of Vermont, and then compared to the rest of the
country. If the ratio in the rest of the country is higher, this
would tend to support the idea that mandating ENEs is
E.D. Va. Civ. R. 83.6.
See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 16.1(c); D. Vt. R. 16.1.
89
Compare S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 16.1(c), D. Vt. R. 16.1 and C.D. Cal. General
Order 11–10 § 5 and 6; E.D. Cal. R. 271.
87
88
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efficient because it promotes more settlement. If the ratios
are roughly equivalent, this would tend to support the idea
that mandating ENEs is not more efficient because it doesn’t
result in more settlements. If the ratio in the rest of the
country is lower, this would support the idea that mandating
ENEs is inefficient because fewer settlements end up
occurring. Summarized, a higher ratio indicates less
efficiency than a lower ratio.
Having identified where the ratio should be
calculated and compared, determining the appropriate time
period for analysis is necessary. Since the pandemic
dramatically upended litigation trends and first began in
2020, the time period should not extend past the end of
2019.90 Extending analysis into 2020 would inevitably skew
data in unpredictable ways and call into question the validity
of any empirical conclusions.91 Extending the period back
too far could also give outsized influence to litigation trends
before electronic filing and internet correspondence became
the modern norm.92 Ultimately, a six-year period from 2013
through 2019 seems appropriate. It spans a period
representative of modern litigation trends, equally spans two
very different federal administrations, and is sufficiently
long enough to prevent an annual anomaly from skewing the
results.93

See generally LEGAL AID INTERAGENCY ROUNDTABLE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE
IN THE AGE OF COVID-19: A ROUNDTABLE REPORT (2021),
90

https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1445356/download.
91
See generally id.
92
See Jason Krause, The Force of E-Filing, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 2, 2006, 9:32
A.M.), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_force_of_e_filing (efiling began in 1996).
93
See id.; Difference Between Donald Trump and Barack Obama,
DIFFERENCEBETWEEN.NET,
http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/politics/difference-betweendonald-trump-and-barack-obama/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2022) (describing the
differences between the Obama and Trump administration); LEGAL AID
INTERAGENCY ROUNDTABLE, supra note 103.
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Lastly, the data source used in analysis should be
identified. The Federal Judicial Center (FJC), in conjunction
with the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (AO),
maintain an integrated database of filings and terminations
in the federal district courts.94 While the FJC and AO “make
every effort to ensure the accuracy of the data,” they do
admit “some problems with specific fields that are not
routinely reported.”95 Unfortunately, one of these routinely
unreported data fields is case disposition, simply categorized
as “missing.”96 To avoid unknown case dispositions from
being inaccurately categorized, any case that was missing a
disposition record was removed from the analysis.
Thus, the final product for analysis has a relatively
simple methodology. First, the total number of recorded
civil cases that were filed on or after January 1, 2013, and
terminated before December 31, 2019, were recorded for
each applicable circuit and district. Then, the number of
cases that are missing disposition records were subtracted
from that total. The result is the number of cases with known
disposition records. Then, this known disposition case
number was divided by the number of cases that have
“settlement” as the recorded disposition. The result of this
equation provides a filing to settlement ratio previously
mentioned. These ratios were averaged across all numbered
circuits to provide a national average. Since the District of
Vermont and Southern District of California are within the
First and Ninth Circuits respectively, averages including and
excluding these circuits were calculated. The following
three data tables summarize this empirical analysis:
Table 4.1: Settlement Ratio Calculations
Integrated Database Research Guide, supra note 56, at 1.
Id. at 4.
96
FED. JUD. CTR., INTEGRATED DATA BASE: CIVIL DOCUMENTATION,
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/idb/codebooks/Civil%20Codebook%20
1988%20Forward.pdf.
94
95
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District Cases
or Circuit Filed After
01/01/
2013 &
Terminated
Before
12/31/2019
D. of Vt. 1935
S.D. Cal. 19479
1st Cir. 50452
2nd Cir. 174510
3rd Cir. 235008
4th Cir. 252039
5th Cir. 235659
6th Cir. 161671
7th Cir. 161726
8th Cir. 103549
9th Cir. 328834
10th Cir. 75831
11th Cir. 501683
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Cases
Missing
Disposition
Records

Cases with
Dispositio
Records
(Numerator)

Cases
Filing to
Settled Settlement
(Deno- Ratio
minator)

275
2428
9474
29093
76955
19453
50267
35010
29351
10391
47256
10107
299411

1660
19479
40978
145417
158053
232586
185392
126661
132375
93158
281578
65724
202272

425
4927
9815
36027
62293
107711
43544
30427
36188
16547
54689
15111
55031

3.90588
3.95352
4.17504
4.03633
2.53725
2.15935
4.25758
4.16278
3.65798
5.62990
5.14871
4.34941
3.67560
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Table 4.2: Average Settlement Ratios and Differentials
Average Settlement
3.9809
Ratio (All Numbered
Circuits)
Average Settlement
3.8296
Ratio (Without 1st
and 9th Circuits)
Settlement Ratio
-0.0750 1st and
+0.0763
Difference Between
9th
D. of Vt. and All
Removed
Circuits
Settlement Ratio
-0.0274 1st and
+0.1239
Difference Between
9th
S.D. Cal. and All
Removed
Circuits
Table 4.3: Efficiency Results as a Percentage
Federal
Differential as
Differential as
District
Percentage of
Percentage of
Average (All
Average (1st and 9th
Numbered Circuits) Circuits Removed)
D. of Vt.
1.88% greater
1.99% worse
efficiency
efficiency
S.D. Cal. 0.69% greater
3.23% worse
efficiency
efficiency
V.

Conclusions and Recommendations
Like most empirical studies in law, perhaps the
clearest finding is that the conclusion is unclear.
Surprisingly, when the First and Ninth Circuit were removed
from the comparison, the District of Vermont and Southern
District of California appeared to be marginally less efficient
than the rest of the country.97 However, when the First and
Ninth Circuit were added into the comparison, both districts
97

See supra Part IV.
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appeared to be marginally more efficient than the rest of the
country. 98 This appears to reflect that the District of
Vermont and Southern District of California have slightly
lower filing to settlement ratios than their respective
circuits.99
The conflicting conclusions highlight the
previously discussed problem of comparing federal
districts.100 Is it fair to say that federal courts in Vermont
and San Diego are more efficient when only compared to
their neighboring districts in the same circuit? Or is it better
to compare Vermont with a similarly rural state in a different
circuit and San Diego with a similarly sized metropolitan
area on the West Coast? Or is the best comparison a total
national average as presented here? Predictably, these
questions do not have conclusive answers. 101 They are a
natural limitation to any conclusions drawn from this data.
There are also other serious limitations of this
empirical analysis.102 As briefly mentioned in Part IV, there
is no way to tell whether cases missing disposition records
resulted in a settlement or not. 103 While such missing
records accounted for a small percentage of filings in most
circuits, they accounted for almost 60% of all filings in the
Eleventh Circuit from 2013 to 2019. 104 Aside from the
missing records, two significant assumptions have also been
crucial. 105 Specifically, that settlement will always be a
more efficient outcome for both parties than other case
dispositions, and that settlement always prevents future
litigation.106 Thankfully, these assumptions and limitations
Id.
Id.
See id.
101
See id.
102
See id.
103
See id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
98
99

100
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don’t prevent reaching a reasonable conclusion based on the
data.
The empirical analysis indicates an interesting
variation from the expected results based on legal theory.107
If ENE’s inherently promoted efficiency, as legal theory
tends to support, then both Vermont and San Diego would at
least appear consistently more efficient than the national
average. 108 In reality, the largest percentage difference
indicated that the Southern District of California is less
efficient than the national average. 109 Additionally, the
percentage difference in every comparison appears
marginal.110 If mandating ENEs truly made an impact, one
would also expect a notable variance.111 While a statistical
significance analysis was not conducted, it is fair to say that
3.2% and below is an insignificant variation.112
These insignificant and conflicting variations
prevent a conclusion as to whether mandated ENEs lead to
greater or less efficiency. Instead, one can reasonably
conclude that mandated ENEs do not lead to any discernable
change in a filing to settlement ratio.113 Essentially, the data
does not support the notion that mandated ENEs inherently
increase efficiency. 114 This means that a case in federal
court isn’t more likely to settle just because it was forced into
an ADR process. Mandating ENEs doesn’t appear to do
anything to encourage settlement. Cases that settle would

See supra Part III.
Id.
109
See supra Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.
110
Id.
111
Cf. Michael J. Mauboussin, The True Measures of Success, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Oct. 2020) https://hbr.org/2012/10/the-true-measures-of-success (explaining
selecting statistics in the corporate context).
112
See supra Figure 4.3.
113
See supra pp. 11–12.
114
See supra Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.
107
108
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probably have settled without the added step of mandatory
ADR.115
This apparent ineffectual relationship challenges
the utility of mandated ADR and a simple recommendation
follows. The Southern District of California and the District
of Vermont could simply change their local rules to allow
parties to opt-out of ADR. 116 Litigants would still
presumptively participate in ENEs but could opt-out if a selfassessment indicated that ADR would be unproductive. 117
This change would reduce the risk that an ENE results in
added costs that do not save the parties time or money.118
The Western District of Tennessee and South Carolina allow
for opt-out after presumptive ENE participation and most
civil cases would likely still participate in the ENEs.119
Thus, the discussion and analysis of mandated
ENEs ends with a small tweak rather than a dramatic
proposal. This is fitting given the many uncertainties
surrounding what mandating ENEs does in theory versus in
practice. Hypotheticals can cut both ways and basing strict
court mandates on theoretical efficiency is tenuous. In the
spirit of Professor Fiss, courts should be cautious in pursuing
“indiscriminate” methods to promote efficiency. 120 You
may not actually achieve what theory tells you to expect.

But see Deborah Ruff, Charles Goslong, Julia Belcher, & Charlotte StewartJones, Compulsory Mediation: Is There an Upside?, LAW. MONTHLY (Dec.
2021) https://www.lawyer-monthly.com/2022/01/compulsory-mediation-isthere-an-upside/.
116
See, e.g., Plan for ADR in W.D. Tenn. § 2.1.
117
Id.
118
See discussion supra pp. 12–13.
119
See Plan for ADR in W.D. Tenn. § 2.1; D.S.C. R. 16.03.
120
See Fiss supra note 49, at 1075.
115
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